The Decision at Waterloo

Why Napoleon Committed the Imperial Guard

What sealed Napoleon’s fate at Waterloo was not defeat, but a single decision.
Though the situation on the field had turned against him, he believed he would not lose—and that conviction summoned the Imperial Guard onto the battlefield.
This essay is not about the Waterloo campaign as a whole, but about the precise moment when Napoleon resolved to commit the Guard
(Chandler, 1966; Barbero, 2003).

To us, who know how Waterloo ended, that decision appears reckless. Yet to Napoleon at that moment, the commitment of the Guard was not a gamble. He did not think in terms of defeat. Recognizing that the situation was unfavorable was not the same as believing that he could lose. Napoleon remained convinced, to the very end, that he would prevail. That conviction was the point from which the decision emerged
(Tulard, 1984; Dwyer, 2008).

A sober look at the situation immediately before the Guard was committed shows that the war was not yet closed. Blücher’s main force had not arrived at the center of the battlefield; only elements of the Prussian army were engaged on the French right, particularly around Plancenoit. The French army was not encircled. Night was approaching, and there remained both time and space for an organized nocturnal withdrawal
(Siborne, 1848; Chesney, 1868).

Most of the Imperial Guard had not yet been committed to combat. More importantly, Napoleon still possessed approximately 30,000 troops under Grouchy, detached and unspent in the main engagement. In Paris, Davout remained in charge of the capital’s defense and political stability. Objectively speaking, the conditions required to continue the war had not disappeared
(Chandler, 1966; Barbero, 2003).

Yet none of these facts proved decisive in Napoleon’s judgment. He had no intention of managing the battle. For him, Waterloo was not a phase in a campaign; it was a stage on which the conclusion had to be delivered. This shift in perception was the true reason the Guard was summoned
(Tulard, 1984).

At this point, Napoleon’s psychological state differed fundamentally from despair. He did not commit the Guard out of fear. On the contrary, he acted from a conviction that he was not a man who could lose. At Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, he had repeatedly driven forward through unfavorable conditions and emerged victorious. These repeated successes crystallized into a single myth: when circumstances are at their worst, I always win. This myth was not hope—it became identity. And identity does not permit retreat
(Clausewitz, On War; Dwyer, 2008).

For this reason, the Guard was not a reserve force. It was not a shield against defeat. It was the final proof meant to confirm victory. “The moment has ripened.” “One final push will end it.” By committing the Guard, Napoleon did not wait for the outcome of the battle. He attempted to force its conclusion
(Chandler, 1966).

Yet at precisely this moment, another decision remained possible. To keep the Guard intact. To execute a night withdrawal as darkness fell. To preserve the army and prepare a defensive posture. To regroup with Grouchy’s forces, or at least delay Allied pursuit. To return the war from a conclusion to a campaign. This option lacked glory, but it was realistic
(Esdaile, 2015).

Politics and diplomacy function only when war has not been definitively concluded. Had Napoleon refrained from committing the Guard and chosen a night withdrawal instead, he might have lost the battle—but the war would not have ended. Saint Helena might have been avoided
(Esdaile, 2015; Barbero, 2003).

But this option was invisible to Napoleon. Or rather, it could not be seen. A night withdrawal was tactically sound, yet incompatible with his identity. Retreat was not calculation—it was the collapse of his personal myth. He transformed a battle that could be lost into a decision that could not. In that moment, alternatives vanished
(Tulard, 1984; Dwyer, 2008).

What destroyed Napoleon at Waterloo was not artillery, not manpower, and not Blücher. It was the conviction that, even as the situation deteriorated, he would inevitably prevail. Had he not committed the Guard, the war would not have ended. But he did commit it.

Wars do not always end on the battlefield.
Sometimes, they end the moment a single individual decides not to doubt his own myth.

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References
• Chandler, D. G., The Campaigns of Napoleon, 1966
• Barbero, A., The Battle: A History of Waterloo, 2003
• Tulard, J., Napoleon: The Myth of the Saviour, 1984
• Dwyer, P., Napoleon: The Path to Power / Citizen Emperor, 2008
• Siborne, W., History of the Waterloo Campaign, 1848
• Chesney, C., Waterloo Lectures, 1868
• Clausewitz, C. v., On War
• Esdaile, C., Napoleon, France and Waterloo, 2015